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1. INTRODUCTION
Bot is a malicious piece of software derived from 
the	word	 ‘robot’,	which	when	 installed	 in	 a	 host	makes	
it	 a	Zombie	machine.	Botnets	 are	 a	group	of	distributed	
bots controlled by a master computer often referred to 
as	 botmaster	 (remote	 attacker).	A	 zombie	 machine	 may	
respond to genuine requests as well as the requests from 
its botmaster simultaneously. The responses for the genuine 
requests do not exhibit similarity. But the responses for 
the botmaster exhibit a high degree of similarity. This 
similarity can be used to distinguish the presence of 
malware.	Many	modern	botnets	rely	on	dynamic/fast-flux	
DNS services. In a fast-flux DNS technique, hundreds 
or thousands of compromised hosts are used as proxies 
to hide the identities of the true command and control 
(C&C)	 servers.	 These	 hosts	 constantly	 alternate	 in	 a	
round-robin fashion to resolve one hostname to many 
different IP addresses1. Bots can basically be classified 
into two types.
 
1.1 Network-based Bots
These bots generate attacks on the victim machine 
in an attempt to overload the computing resources. These 
bots perform various attacks such as spamming, phishing, 
clickjacking,	 and	 different	 flooding	 attacks,	 viz.,	 UDP	
flood attacks, SYN flood attacks, Socket flood attacks, 
and HTTP flood attacks.
1.2 Host-based Bots
These are bots which get installed in the victim 
machine automatically when the user downloads any kind 
of freeware from the internet. These are Trojans which 
are bound along with the software downloaded from the 
internet using binder software which the victim is totally 
unaware of. These bots are developed with features such 
as keylogging for closely monitoring user behavior, 
interception of sensitive data including passwords and 
monitoring of mouse clicks. Bots usually communicate 
with their botmaster in order to receive commands from 
them. Based on this behavior, bots can be categorised 
into many types as discussed in the following
IRC bots make use of internet relay chat protocol 
for communication. The detection of such kinds of bots 
is done by using number of features such as average 
packet	 size,	 ratio	 of	 visible	 to	 invisible	 users	 in	 the	
channel, unusual or common nicknames used during 
the chat, average word length, string distance, etc.[2] 
Alternatively the command and control of botmaster can 
be implemented by message exchanges using HTTP. Such 
bots are known as HTTP bots. These HTTP bots are 
detected by observing the degree of periodic repeatability 
in bot communication using packet information such as 
source and destination IP addresses and the inter arrival 
time between the packets3.	In	a	Peer2Peer(P2P)	network,	
attackers	 make	 use	 of	 the	 decentralized	 structure	 of	
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the peer to peer protocol to implement P2P botnets, 
utilizing	 the	 availability	 of	 more	 bandwidth,	 storage,	
and computational power. A case study on Trojan. 
Peacomm	 bot	 shows	 the	 realization	 of	 P2P	 botnets,	
where the bots use Trojan for the primary injection 
and the P2P network for downloading the secondary 
injections4. Spambots are pieces of malware that are 
responsible for generation and delivery of spam mails. 
Spambots can be identified by examining the type, 
header, and contents of a single data packet5. Click 
bots are generated by clickjacking attack, where the 
victim is made to click on an element of a malicious 
webpage as created by the attacker. Vulnerabilities in 
JavaScript	and	HTML/CSS	features	are	misused	to	create	
such attacks. These attacks can be avoided by taking 
the coordinates of clickable elements on a webpage6. 
Bots are known to generate DDoS attacks, wherein the 
attack is generated from multiple IP addresses in order 
to saturate a target network, using all the available 
bandwidth. Flooding attacks are usually prevented 
by rate limiting or black listing the IP addresses7. 
2. RELATED WORK
Bots	 are	 characterized	 based	 on	 their	 responses	
to remote control. This is done by observing the way 
bots and the genuine programs communicate over the 
network. Bots also create files and interact within 
the network similar to genuine programs. But these 
bots can be identified by distinguishing between the 
remotely initiated and locally initiated actions based 
on the system calls invoked8. Botnets are detected on 
observing the unique pattern of group activities among 
the botnet DNS traffic and genuine DNS traffic9. An 
anomaly based detection method exists, where the bots 
and	 their	 controllers	 are	 identified	 by	 summarizing	 the	
flow records between the local and the remote attacker 
machine on a particular port for over a considerable 
period of time10. In the detection of botnets based on 
their communication patterns, the packets filtered from 
the captured network traffic are monitored, clustered 
and	are	then	sent	through	a	flow	analyzer	and	necessary	
reports are generated11.	 SLINGbot:	 A	 system	 for	 live	
investigation	 of	 next	 generation	 botnets	 characterizes	
bots based on the command and control traffic in a 
simulated environment12.	 BlackEnergy	 is	 a	 web-based	
bot capable of generating distributed denial of service 
(DDoS)	 attacks.	 These	 bots	 aim	 at	 bombarding	 the	
victim machine with DDoS attacks and use a runtime 
encrypter for preventing its detection by the anti-virus. 
Based on the analysis it is seen that these bots use 
HTTP	 to	 communicate	 to	 the	 C&C	 server	 by	 sending	
a	 POST	 message	 to	 the	 server13.
3. MOTIVATION
It was found from literatures2,9 that bot exhibits 
uniqueness in maintaining connectivity with their botmasters 
through a regular exchange of messages. This led us to 
use this communication pattern as a key component for 
bot detection. Hence in this paper, a kernel level packet 
filtering module namely, pattern programmable kernel 
filter	 (PPKF),	 which	 would	 filter	 out	 the	 malicious	
packets generated by bots, based on their repetitive 
communication pattern is proposed.
4. PROPOSED WORK
4.1 Pattern Programmable Kernel Filter
The block schematic of the pattern programmable 
kernel	filter	(PPKF)	as	shown	in	Fig.1	gives	the	basic	flow	
of the filter wherein the outbound packets are captured 
by the kernel packet capture module. Then the pattern 
inference	module	(PI)	analyzes	the	packets	and	identifies	
the pattern in them. If found, then the unique pattern is 
programmed into the PPKF module thus enabling it to 
filter out all the malicious packets at kernel level before 
being put onto the network. Fig. 2 shows the positioning 
of components of the proposed system into the kernel 
space. Notations A1, A2, …, An, indicate the existence 
of various applications in the user space, which may 
generate genuine as well as malicious packets. Packets 
generated by these applications are captured and are 
processed by the PI module for inference of pattern, if 
any. If found then the PPKF is programmed with this 
pattern to filter out the malicious packets generated by 
bot. According to the proposed system the pattern can 
either be generated automatically at kernel level from 
the packet payload or it can be inferred from network 
traces through offline analysis and then the PPKF can 
be	programmed	accordingly.	Pattern	for	SpyEye	bot	was	
obtained in this paper from offline analysis from the 
network traces and then programmed into the PPKF. 
Figure 1. Block schematic of pattern programmable kernel 
filter.
Figure 2. Positioning of the proposed PPKF into kernel space.
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5. WORK DONE
The effective working of the proposed system was 
tested by generating a bot attack in and using the 
PPKF driver for its mitigation. Bot attack was generated 
with	 the	 recently	 released	 SpyEye	 exploit	 kit.	 Traffic	
analysis was done using wireshark and malicious traffic 
pattern	 with	 respect	 to	 SpyEye	 bot	 was	 identified.	 
5.1 Experimental Setup
SpyEye Tool Kit: The important feature of this 
exploit kit is to steal user information such as username, 
password, and other sensitive data of the user from 
the victim machine. This is a web based tool kit with 
command and control facilities. The kit basically builds 
a backdoor Trojan which is sent to the victim machine to 
take control of the PC. During the bot building process 
the tool provides the following options: Path to the main 
control	panel,	 time	 interval,	UPX,	and	Kill	Zeus	option.	
The path to the main control panel specifies the path where 
the web server, with which the bot has to communicate, 
is set up. Time interval refers to the connector interval 
of	 time	 the	 bot	 has	 to	 connect	 to	 its	 master.	 UPX	 is	
the ultimate packer for executables, wherein the tool 
compresses all the executables into a single build, which 
is the malicious file to be sent to the victim machine. 
Running	 a	 SpyEye	 bot	 requires	 a	 web	 server	 running	
in	 a	 MySQL,	 PHP	 environment.	 The	 operating	 systems	
which	 support	 SpyEye	 range	 from	 windows	 2000	 to	
windows	7.	SpyEye	uses	the	hook	function	Wininet	API,	
which	is	a	Microsoft	programming	interface	for	windows	
that provides access to various protocols such as HTTP, 
FTP, and Gopher. The malicious bot program makes few 
registry changes during its first installation and thereby 
starts functioning in the victim machine14,15.
5.2 Bot Attack Generation
An Intel Core 2 Duo processor machine with windows 
7	 (victim	 machine	 1)	 OS	 installed	 in	 it	 was	 made	 the	
victim machine. The malicious build created using the 
SpyEye	 toolkit	 was	 sent	 to	 the	 victim	 machine	 as	 an	
E-mail	attachment	embedded	along	with	a	genuine	picture	
file.	 Once	 the	 victim	 extracts	 the	 rar	 file	 to	 view	 the	
genuine picture, the bot gets installed on the victim 
machine	 thus	making	 it	a	Zombie	machine.	The	attacker	
machine	 which	 is	 also	 the	 C&C	 server	 was	 configured	
with	 WAMP	 to	 run	 the	 Apache	 web	 server	 with	 PHP,	
MySQL	 environment.	 The	 same	 malicious	 build	 file	
was	 sent	 to	 two	 more	 machines	 in	 the	 same	 LAN	 and	
their communication was noted. The successful attack 
generation is evident from Fig. 3 which are marked in 
boxes. 
5.3 Result Analysis
The	SpyEye	bot	used	HTTP	for	communication.	When	
the traffic was sorted with various filter expressions in 
wireshark, a regular exchange of HTTP packets between 
the	Zombie	machine	and	the	Botmaster	with	a	particular	
periodicity was observed. From the captured traffic, HTTP 
packets were filtered and graphs were drawn which showed 
all	the	nodes	involved	in	communication	with	the	zombie	
machine with their respective source and destination IP 
addresses. Further from the HTTP flow graph drawn 
as	 in	 Fig.	 3	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 zombie	 machine	 is	
sending	 its	 own	 details,	 viz.,	 computer	 name,	 username	
of	 the	 computer,	 status	 of	 the	machine	 (online),	 version	
of	 OS,	 etc.,	 to	 the	 attacker	 machine	 periodically.	 Thus	
based upon this communication, a pattern to be used 
for the detection of bots was identified and a pattern 
programmable Kernel level packet filtering algorithm is 
proposed for the mitigation of bots. 
5.4 Pattern Programmable Packet Filtering 
Algorithm
From the Fig. 3, it is evident that the victim machine 
is reporting to the attacker machine constantly at various 
time	instances	say	t1,	t2,	t3,	t4.	From	this,	the	∆T	values	
viz.,	 T1,	 T2,	 T3	 are	 calculated	 which	 clearly	 show	 the	
Figure 3. HTTP flow graph.
constant time interval between them, where t1, t2, t3, t4 
are the arrival time of the packets in IST format.
t1 = 12:16:42  T1=t2-t1=5 mins 
t2 = 12:21:43  T2=t3-t2=5 mins 
t3 = 12:26:44  T3=t4-t3=5 mins 
t4 = 12:31:45
Proposed PPKF Algorithm
Step 1: Capture traffic at kernel level
Step 2: Filter outbound TCP packets
Step 3: Inspect
   If	 (packets	 =	 GET/POST	 packets)
	 	 	 	 	 Then	 Pattern	 Check;
    If Pattern Found
       a. Compute Periodicity
  b. Perform Remote Address Checking
     If ((Periodicity	Exists)	&&	(Remote	Address	Check 
	 	 is	 verified)	 ||	 	
					(Periodicity	Exists)	&&	(Remote	Address	Check	 
	 	 is	 not	 verified)	 ||	
				(Periodicity	does	not	Exist)	&&	(Remote	Address	 
	 	 Check	 is	 verified))
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  Then Block
  Else Allow
 Else  Allow
Else  Allow
Step 4: End
Pattern Check
  If (TcpData==SpecifiedPattern)
    Then Set Pattern Found = True
 Else Set Pattern Found = False
Return 
The proposed algorithm uses two levels of verification 
for bot detection namely, periodicity calculation, and 
remote address verification. In case of dynamic fast flux 
botnets, the pattern from the suspected packets may be 
the same along with periodicity in them but their IP 
addresses may differ. So the remote addresses are cross 
checked to look for similarities among them. Periodicity 
is	 also	 taken	 into	 account	 since	 the	 zombie	 machines	
report to their botmasters the user information periodically. 
Finding the exact pattern becomes the key component to 
filter	 out	 the	 malicious	 bot	 packets.	 Malicious	 packets	
in this context refer to the packets which the Botmaster 
sends to the victim to maintain its connectivity and also 
the packets sent from the victim machine in response to 
the packets from its botmaster. 
5.5 Detection Module at Victim Machine for Kernel 
Level Packet Filtering
The appropriate signatures for blocking the malicious 
packets	 with	 respect	 to	 SpyEye	 bot	 were	 found	 to	 be	
HTTP	packets	containing	the	following	keywords,	‘Guid’,	
‘Online’,	 in	 their	 packet	 payload.	 Their	 communication	
pattern is discussed in part C of this Section. In similar 
fashion, signature for other bots can also be found and 
embedded into the PPKF. Further the bot attack was 
generated	in	three	different	environments,	viz.,	a	machine	
running	windows	XP,	a	machine	running	windows	7,	and	
also on a virtual machine running windows 7. The results 
with respect to the communication pattern and periodicity 
were found to be the same in all the three cases. The 
developed PPKF was installed on the victim machine 1. 
A	GUI	 called	 open	 system	 resource	 (OSR)	 was	 used	 to	
load/unload the packet filter in the victim machine. The 
loading/unloading of a filter can also be done manually 
which involves making registry changes manually and 
then starting the filter through command prompt. 
Windows Filtering Platform: The PPKF was developed 
using	the	WFP	filter	engine.	It	is	an	application	programming	
interface	(API)	that	allows	processing/filtering	of	packets	
in the network stack. It provides a filtering engine which 
can be used for packet filtering at kernel level. It is 
intended for use by various applications such as firewalls, 
and	also	for	packet-processing.	The	WFP	includes	a	filter	
engine, base filtering engine, and a callout. The filter 
engine provides the basic filtering capabilities which 
span across both the kernel and the user-mode. The 
Base filtering engine manages the filter engine. Callout 
functions are used for registering the filter rules and are 
invoked when the filtering conditions are matched16.  
 
6. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Bot attack was generated in two different machines 
under three different scenarios and the communication 
behaviors	of	the	victim	machines	were	noted.	Web	traffic	
was	generated	by	using	three	different	web	browsers,	viz.,	
Mozilla	 Firefox,	 Internet	 Explorer,	 and	 Google	 Chrome	
and the total number of packets between the Botmaster 
and	zombie	machine	during	the	attack	period	were	noted	
as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Bot attack results in victim machine
Web browser used Total 
no. of 
packets
No. of 
packets 
between BM 
and victim 
machine
No. of HTTP 
packets 
between BM 
and victim 
machine
Internet	Explore 9951 72 11
	Mozilla	Firefox 13584 224 41
Google Chrome 17518 84 14
The packet capture results shown in the Table 1 
correspond to the bot attack generated on victim machine 
1. The results are based on the network traffic captured 
on	 the	 victim	 machine	 using	 wireshark.	 While	 using	
Internet	 Explorer	 and	Mozilla	 Firefox	 as	 web	 browsers	
it	 was	 evident	 that	 the	 zombie	 machine	 effectively	
posted all user information such as web page browsed 
by the user, user name and password submitted in the 
web forms to the botmaster. But when Google chrome 
was used as web browser it was noticed that the HTTP 
‘Post’	 packets,	 viz.,	 the	 packets	 containing	 information	
such as web page browsed by the user, user name and 
password were not sent to the botmaster. Instead only 
the	HTTP	reporting	packets	from	the	zombie	machine	to	
the Bot master were noticed, thus maintaining the Bot 
communication. So it is inferred that the botmaster still 
maintains	 connectivity	 with	 the	 zombie	 machine.	 This	
situation	 is	 averted	 by	 using	 the	 ‘PPKF’	 wherein	 the	
filters all the malicious packets between the botmaster 
and	the	zombie	machine	 thus	 totally	suppressing	 the	bot	
traffic. The results shown in Table 1 were with respect 
to the experiments tested on windows 7 machine.
The performance analysis of the proposed PPKF 
was done by measuring the number of packets in the 
victim machine before and after loading the filter. The 
captured network traffic from Figs. 4 and 5, show the 
total number of packets measured between the botmaster 
and	zombie	machine	before	and	after	installing	the	filter	
respectively. The results are tabulated in Table 2. The data 
shown in Table 2 has correlation along vertical columns 
4, 6, 8, and 10 only. It is evident from the 2nd row of 
Table 2 that packets going to the botmaster are totally 
being suppressed by PPKF. Since the packet carrying 
user information from the bot infected machine is filtered 
DEF.	 SCI.	 J.,	VOL.	 62,	 NO.	 3,	MAY	 2012
178
Figure 4. Total No. of packets between the Botmaster and zombie 
machine using Mozilla Firefox-before installing the 
PPKF driver.
Figure 5.  Total number of packets between the Botmaster and 
zombie machine-after installing the PPKF driver.
Total no. of packets Outbound (From bot machine) Inbound (To bot machine)
Total no. To	BM	only HTTP packets Total no. From	BM	only HTTP packets
Total no. To	BM	only Total no. From	BM	only
Before 13584 5484 129 662 19 6773 95 638 22
After 12898 3528 - 521 - 3903 - 516 -
Table 2. Performance analysis of packet capture statistic in victim machine (Mozilla Firefox).
out as seen from row 2, columns 4 and 6, there is no 
scope for the botmaster to maintain connectivity with the 
zombie	machine	which	is	evident	from	row	2,	columns	8	
and 10. This enables us to attain 100 per cent accuracy 
in terms of stopping the bot communication.
for sponsoring this research work under the collaborative 
directed basic research in smart and secure environment 
project. Also we thank the anonymous reviewers for 
their critical review which improved the quality of this 
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